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ABSTRACT

Just Borders: The Foundations of Immigration Policy
by
Cody Fenwick

Advisor: Karen Miller

Do countries have a presumptive right to limit immigration at their discretion? It is often
assumed that they do, though both the immigration restrictions championed in practice and the
purported justifications for the principled right to deny entry to foreigners are often supported by
implicit (or explicit) racist prejudices. Many political philosophers have offered putatively more
sophisticated and reasoned defenses of the state’s discretionary right to restrict immigration. I
discuss the philosophical arguments for the restrictionist view on grounds of national territorial
rights, and separately, on the grounds of nationalist partiality toward one’s fellow citizens. I will
argue that both of these apparent grounds for immigration restrictions fail to justify the right to
adopt exclusionary policies. My thesis, then, is a negative one, breaking down a philosophical
position and dismantling its arguments rather than constructing a new theory. But in casting
down a fundamentally flawed theory, my arguments, I believe, gesture toward the outline of a
more promising view of just national borders.
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INTRODUCTION
On his campaign website, then-candidate for president Donald Trump declared in 2016, “A
nation without borders is not a nation. … A nation that does not serve its own citizens is not a
nation. Any immigration plan must improve jobs, wages, and security for all Americans.”
And when Bernie Sanders, a Democratic candidate for president, was asked specifically
in an interview with Vox about whether an “open borders” policy — effectively eliminating
immigration restrictions — could make the world’s poor much better off, he replied:
“It would make everybody in America poorer — you're doing away with the concept of a
nation state, and I don't think there's any country in the world that believes in that. If you
believe in a nation state or in a country called the United States or UK or Denmark or any
other country, you have an obligation in my view to do everything we can to help poor
people.”
These quotes both reflect essentially the same view: national sovereignty—that is, that which
makes a country a country—requires restricted access to immigration. This is a common view,
and it is conceptually distinct from the bias and often-malicious prejudice often directed toward
immigrants. But whether it can be justified or made commensurate with the foundational
principles of liberal democracy is an open question.
Philosophers have offered myriad arguments in support of restrictionist immigration
policies like those Sanders and Trump defended in the preceding quotes. On the restrictionist
view, it is up to countries to choose which immigration policies they would like to adopt through
their deliberate processes. In other words, nations are justified in exercising near-complete
discretion to restrict immigration, and they can do so without violating the bounds of justice (the
major widely accepted exception to this discretion is the international law regarding refugees and
asylum seekers). My aim is to examine these arguments and see whether they hold up against
1

critical scrutiny.
The arguments I discuss argue for this view either on grounds of national territorial rights
or on grounds of nationalist partiality toward one’s fellow citizens (or some combination of the
two). I will argue that both of these apparent grounds for immigration restrictions fail to justify
these policies. My thesis, then, is a negative one, breaking down a philosophical position and
dismantling its arguments rather than constructing a new theory. But in casting down a
fundamentally flawed theory, my arguments, I believe, gesture toward the outline of a more
promising view.
But before delving into philosophical theory, it is worth examining the state of the
mainstream debates about immigration policy. The history and present of immigration
restrictions in the United States has been repeatedly been justified with appeals to false and
bigoted ideas, as I will show. While I later consider serious philosophical arguments in favor of
immigration restrictions, understanding the racism at the center of much anti-immigrant
sentiment is a necessary precondition for assessing the foundations of these policies.
As Charles Jaret notes, though attitudes towards immigration at the turn of the twentieth
century in the United States were relatively lax, the major exception was anti-immigrant bias
toward Asians. In particular, many working class people were particularly suspect of Chinese
immigrants, whom they accused of taking the jobs and wages that belonged to Americans.1
Labor unions, backed largely by white workers, lobbied successfully for passage of the
Chinese exclusion act in 1882, which restricted immigration by Chinese workers. The unions
typically justified this policy based on the need to protect union jobs and to prevent the supply of
cheap Chinese labor from driving down wages for the rest of the population. Prior to the Chinese
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Exclusion Act, the Immigration Act of 1875 banned criminals from immigrating to the United
States, and prohibited the bringing in or contracting of forced Asian immigrant Labor. This was
the first American law passed to limit immigration.
Reviewing a series of anti-Asian posters and cartoons in her article “Old ‘Yellow Peril’
Anti-Chinese Propaganda,” Gwen Sharp sheds light on the some of the motivations for exclusion
and prejudices towards these immigrants. Before the categorization of Latinos had cultural
meaning, Asians were seen not as white or black, but as yellow, giving rise to fear mongering
over the supposed “yellow threat.” Most of the Chinese immigrants who came to the United
States before the twentieth century were single men—women were not allowed to immigrate—
and they were viewed as threats to white women. In these images the Chinese men are depicted
as ravenous, animalistic, and violent, with grossly exaggerated and racialized features. Other
imagery stressed the moral superiority of white men who took care of their wives and children
over the more itinerant single lives of the Chinese men, who were shown living in squalor. This
imagery was used to stress the injustice of letting immigrants drive down the wages of hardworking native-born American citizens. Sharp notes that attitudes towards the Chinese didn’t
shift again in American thought until the World War II, when they were seen as good relative to
the Japanese, who became the enemy.
Meanwhile, Italians and European Jews, two of the largest groups coming to the United
States at the beginning of the twentieth century, were not viewed, as they largely are in the
twenty-first century, as whites. Rather, they were regarded as “mongrel” races, distinct from
Nordic and Anglo-Saxon peoples.2 Italians and Jews were not seen to be on the same level as the
people of Asian or of African descent, and they were frequently permitted the status of “white”
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citizens when they were naturalized. But there was also a widespread belief, accepted even in
academic and scientific circles of the day, that Jews and Italians could dilute the quality of the
American racial makeup and that they were racially inferior to Northern and Western Europeans.
On the forefront of this form of “scientific racism” was a well-known book published in 1916
called The Passing of the Great Race. Author Michael Grant expounded the virtues of the fairerskinned Europeans while decrying any mixing with the darker-skinned Mediterranean peoples.
Another observer wrote in 1915 about the fears of intermarriage between native-born Americans
and the “new immigrants” that “it is fair to say that the blood now injected into the veins of our
people is sub-common.”3
Jaret observes that straightforward racism of the sort previously commonly expressed
alongside anti-immigrant attitudes, has largely fallen out of favor in the mainstream discourse.4
Certainly, explicitly racist attitudes are still expressed, but these more often come from marginal
voices. Even when mainstream voices express extreme anti-immigrant views, they tend to
include a caveat that the views are not based on race. For instance, when Donald Trump
announced his campaign for president in June 2015, his speech included the lines:
When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. … They’re sending people
that have lots of problems, and they’re bringing those problems with us. They’re bringing
drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.
After facing criticism for these remarks, he urged that he was just stating the truth and that, “I’m
not a racist. I don’t have a racist bone in my body.” Previous opponents of immigration at the
beginning of the twentieth century had no need to deny charges of racism.
But many of the fears now cited about immigration are consistent with those that were
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propounded in the nineteenth century. For instance, even back in 1931, Edith Abott wrote in a
report of the National Commission on Law Observance and Enforcement:
The theory that immigration is responsible for crime, that the most recent ‘wave of
immigration,’ whatever the nationality, is less desirable than the old ones, that all
newcomers should be regarded with an attitude of suspicion, is a theory that is almost as
old as the colonies planted by Englishmen on the New England coast.5
Such claims, though common, are not rooted in reality.
In their analysis of crime and incarceration rates from 1904, Moehling and Peihl found
that there was only mild statistical support for the view that immigrants were particularly prone
to criminal behavior. Rates of major crime were similar for native-born and foreign-born
populations in the United States, except for the cohort of men ages 18 and 19. At these ages,
immigrants were significantly more likely to commit serious crimes. However, this difference
disappeared by 1930, at which time immigrants were slightly less likely to be incarcerated than
the native born population. The authors also note that in 1904 immigrants were more often
charged with minor crimes. They argue that this tells us very little about actual crime rates
because prejudice against immigrants likely led to harsher scrutiny by law enforcement.6
Studies on recent effects of immigration on crime rates are even more definitive. In
particular, Ousey and Kubrin examined Census data on immigration, crime, and other
demographic measures from 1980, 1990, and 2000 in 159 American cities. They examined the
changes in immigration patterns and changes in crime rates, using regression analysis to examine
whether increases in immigration led to a rise in crime. In fact, they found the opposite: areas
with increased immigration saw a decrease in violent crime. They posit that this is due to the
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strong family relationships, which are more common among immigrant households, since singleparent households and divorce rates are positively correlated with crime rates.7 This work joins a
large body of evidence suggesting that immigrants are less likely to commit crimes compared to
native-born Americans. Another more recent study by Aaron Chalfin found that Mexican
immigration specifically led to no increase in the property or violent crime rates in American
cities. To compensate for possibly confounding factors, such as already decreasing crime rates
attracting immigrants to certain cities, Chalfin examined the effects of poor weather patterns in
Mexico as a cause of increased migration. Under these conditions, the null hypothesis was
confirmed.
And yet, anti-immigrant views based on fear of crime persist, as expressed in the quote
above from Trump. During much of his campaign for president in 2015 and 2016, Trump
portrayed the United States as besieged by crime, emphasizing the threat posed by immigrants.
He won the Republican Party nomination in 2016 in part on his pledge to build a wall—paid for
by Mexico—on the southern U.S. border to keep out immigrants. His inaugural address in
January 2017 referred to the “American carnage” of “the crimes and gangs and drugs that have
stolen too many lives.” In December 2017, in the midst of legislative negotiations about
immigrations policy, he said his opponents in the Democratic Party wanted “to have illegal
immigrants pouring into our country, bringing with them crime, tremendous amounts of crime.”
Under the Trump administration, the Department of Homeland Security opened an office
called Victims of Immigration Crime Engagement aimed at drawing attention to immigrant
crimes. The president himself frequently referenced the gang MS-13, largely consisting of
members of Central American heritage, as a major law enforcement priority. The Department of
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Justice released a 2018 report in partnership with DHS purporting to show that immigration was
a major cause of terrorism. Many experts criticized this report as deeply misleading, as it counted
people extradited to the United States who are believed to have committed crimes abroad, and it
did not include in its account any incidents of domestic terrorism.
Trump’s portrayal of the United States as a country gripped by crime did not reflect
reality. He has said multiple times that the country’s murder rate was the “highest it’s been in 47
years,” when in fact it was near a 45-year low. According to data from the Justice Department,
nationwide violent and property crime rates dropped precipitously in 1990s from their heights in
the crime wave that swept the 1970s and 1980s. Though the United States did experience an
increase in the murder rate for a few years following 2014, it still remained exceptionally low by
comparison to recent decades. And since the share of the United States population that is foreignborn continued to rise after crime began to plummet in early 1990s, any attempt to link
immigration to national chaos would strain credibility.
Given the evidence that immigrants do not raise the crime rate, what accounts for the
persistent myth? Brader et. al examined the motivation for opposition to immigration to test the
hypothesis that the most important determinant in anti-immigrant attitudes is who the immigrants
are. They wanted to examine the impact news coverage and media discussions of immigration
affects public opinion. In a series of nationally representative experiments, they found that white
Americans were more opposed to immigration when news about the downsides to immigration
featured images of Latino immigrants rather than Europeans. 8 Even when the information
presented was identical, the researchers found that cues suggesting immigrants belong to a
racialized nonwhite group triggered greater fear and subsequent opposition to increased
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immigration. Respondents who viewed images of European immigrants while the supposed
downsides of immigration were emphasized reported a similar change in their perception of
immigration as a threat, but only the anxiety caused by images of Latino immigrants led to
hostile reactions and attitudes towards immigrants.
This research suggests that opponents of immigration likely are motivated by racist
attitudes, even if they do not recognize them as such. It also means that the most effective
rhetoric against immigration will play on public attitudes and mistrust of racialized groups, even
if it explicitly rejects racism.
When President Trump, having run a campaign that highly exaggerated the extent of
immigrant criminality, moved to make immigration legislation, further evidence of its racist
motivation appeared. In a meeting with a group of senators to discuss a proposal in January
2018, the president wondered aloud why Americans would want immigrants from “shithole”
countries such as Haiti or African nations, according to multiple reports of the event. Instead, he
reportedly suggested that immigrants from places such as Norway should be encouraged to
come. Sen. Tom Cotton of Arkansas, a Republican ally of Trump who worked closely with the
president on immigration legislation, approvingly cited on Twitter an article by writer Andrew
Sullivan arguing “huge shifts in the ethnic and racial demography of a country” were a legitimate
worry for immigration policymakers. Cotton and Trump both endorsed the RAISE Act, which
would cut the authorized immigration rate in half.
One of the other main critiques of immigration that has been popular since the Chinese
Exclusion Act is the claim that immigrants pose an economic threat to the native-born
population, and in particular, those who are economically vulnerable. In the article “The wage
impact of the Marielitos: A reappraisal," for example, George Borjas cites the case of the Mariel
8

Boatlift, a period of mass emigration from Cuba to Miami in the early 1980s, to argue that the
new migrants decreased the wages of native born low-income workers. David Roodman has
disputed these findings and argues that negative effects, such that they exist at all for low-income
workers, are at most very modest. Borjas represents a minority opinion among academic
economists, who by and large view immigration as a boon to the economy as a whole.
But perhaps most interesting is research by Citrin et al. that found that anti-immigrant
sentiment was not very highly correlated with personal economic insecurity. That is, those who
would suffer most if immigration depressed native wages were not much more likely to oppose
immigration. Using the National Election Study survey data from 1992 and 1994, the researchers
found that opposition to immigration was largely driven by perceptions of the health of the
American economy, anxiety over taxes, and negative attitudes towards Asians and Hispanics,
rather than personal economic interest.9
A later study by Fetzer confirmed these findings by examining anti-immigrant attitudes
in the United States, France, and Germany. He used public opinion poll data to analyze personal
characteristics that predicted opposition to immigration in each of these counties. Again, general
economic vulnerability was only weakly correlated with anti-immigrant sentiment; being
unemployed showed no effect on attitudes towards immigrants at all.10 Fetzer also tested the
significance of cultural marginality, and found that belonging to minority racial, ethnic, or
religious groups, as well as being female or foreign born, decreases the likelihood of holding
anti-immigrant views. This is consistent with the view that racial minorities may be more likely
to oppose immigration, because these groups tend to have other characteristics that do contribute
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to the development of anti-immigrant attitudes, such as low educational attainment and lowstatus occupations. Holding all else constant, racial minorities will be more likely to favor
immigration than white Americans.11
In short, many of the purported justifications for anti-immigrant attitudes, such as
immigrant proclivity for crime, are not supported by evidence. Similarly, despite the long-lasting
popularity of the claim that immigrants negatively affect wages, economic vulnerability to these
sorts of conditions is not predictive of personal opposition to immigration. One would assume
that if concern about the economic impacts of immigration were truly an important concern, it
would be felt most by those who would suffer from economic disruption.
Academic studies also suggested that racist attitudes were predictive of support for
Donald Trump’s 2016 president campaign, which, as discussed, perpetuated anti-immigrant
ideas and promised restrictionist policies. Major, Blodorn, and Blascovich found, for example:
Reminding White Americans high in ethnic identification that non-White racial
groups will outnumber Whites in the United States by 2042 caused them to
become more concerned about the declining status and influence of White
Americans as a group (i.e., experience group status threat), and caused them to
report increased support for Trump and anti-immigrant policies.12
Another study by Luttig, Federico, and Lavine found racist attitudes among the president’s
supporters. Trump voters were more likely to oppose housing policies when they were primed to
think the beneficiaries would be a black person rather than a white person. These findings further
support the contention that racist attitudes are a significant motivation behind support for
restrictionist immigration policies.
Though new trends in anti-immigrant attitudes continue to shape policy discussions on
11
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the topic of immigration in the United States, there are resilient threads and patterns of thought
that persist over generations. In what follows, I move from examining the historical patterns of
anti-immigrant sentiment to an analysis of philosophical arguments in favor of strong
immigration restrictions. I will explain and rebut various arguments for a strong discretional right
to exclude immigrants. I break these arguments into two types: those that rely on territorial rights
to justify exclusionary policies and those that rely on concepts of national community and
partiality. Chapter 1 will cover my analysis of the concept of territorial rights and whether they
justify restrictive immigration policy. In Chapter 2, I will turn to the concept of nationalist
partiality.

11

CHAPTER 1: The Dubious Foundations of Territorial Rights
Immigration restriction is not merely a matter of law enforcement, border patrol or
employment policy. When a nation declares that immigrants will only be accepted into its
borders for any long-term period, it is most fundamentally an assertion of territorial rights. It is,
in other words, a claim about land: who has the rights to it, who can enter it, and who can be
justly excluded from it.
In the 21st century, it has become widely accepted that nation-states legitimately claim
territorial rights over all the land within their internationally recognized borders. Since the end of
the Cold War and the following dominance of an increasingly capitalist world order, nations
divide significant portions of their interior lands into private property, ceding much of the
discretionary choices about the care, protection, and maintenance of the land to the owners.
However, even within the scheme of property rights, the state claims various higher-order
rights: most saliently, the right to determine who is granted which land rights and what forms
these rights take. It retains the authority to enforce contracts across property. All other forms of
criminal, civil, tax, business and regulatory laws apply within the land it claims as territory,
subject to constitutional checks. With the use of eminent domain, the state even asserts the right
to reclaim land from the property owner with due compensation. These putatively justified
authorities of the state severely circumscribe the individual right to hold land as private property.
The state also claims the authority to limit the rights of foreigners to enter the country.
This aspect of territorial rights, too, like that of those listed above, is another form of a limitation
on individual property rights. Were a private owner’s land rights absolute, she would be free to
bring any people she wished on to her land, regardless of their citizenship status or national
origin. It might seem that this aspect of immigration restriction only incidentally impinges on
12

land rights, because for any individual landowners to invite a foreign national to their property,
the foreign national would have to enter at an airport or traverse roads that are publicly owned.
Yet consider someone who owns property on the United States-Mexico border, many of whom
face the imposition of having their land marred by an intrusive and unsightly border wall. These
landowners are barred from bringing Mexican nationals straight across the border from Mexico
onto their land. Any Mexican wishing to enter their lands has to at least go through a border
checkpoint; if denied there, entrance to the U.S. citizen’s land is legally impossible. In these
cases, the territorial nature of immigration restrictions becomes obvious.
Political philosophers have proposed several theories of territorial rights that serve to
justify territorial claims. A compelling theory of territorial rights should explain the connection
between the people that comprise the citizenry of a nation and the land that they occupy and
claim.
In proposing such a theory, David Miller breaks territorial rights into three main
elements: jurisdictional rights, resource sovereignty, and border control.13 Jurisdictional rights
entail that the state can legitimately set up and enforce laws over any person within its territory.
Resource sovereignty reserves the management of natural resources for the state. And border
control is the right of the state to control who enters the territory. This right is asymmetric.
International norms do not recognize a general right of states to limit exit from the territory.
Indeed, prohibiting exit from a state can be considered a violation of human rights, except in
special circumstances, such as criminal investigations and punishments.
My main focus in what follows is on the border control element of territorial rights.
Though I discuss theories of territorial rights broadly and will critique them with a wide lens, the
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aim of my analysis is to primarily to assess the justifiability of restrictive immigration policies.
Territorial rights may provide a moral foundation for excluding immigrants. To see how,
consider property rights over land. Our idea of property rights is grounded in the fact that people
have (qualified) rights over their homes and land. These property rights give them the right to
decide who may or may not occupy that space. If someone enters your home in the middle of the
night, or any other time at which they are unwelcome, it is widely believed that you have the
moral and legal right to demand that they leave.14
Do national territorial rights confer upon the state and citizenry comparable discretionary
rights to exclude immigrants? Many assume that they do. But to justify this assumption, we need
a persuasive theory of territorial rights.
We cannot simply assume that states simply have a right to exclude immigrants. As I
discussed in the introduction, immigrants are frequently subjects of bigotry, and bigotry has
consistently motivated erroneous and morally objectionable practice such as the institution of
slavery, the subjugation of women, and the demonization of the LGBT community. And
immigrants have clear interests in being able to enter the countries of their choice. Leaving one’s
home is usually a difficult choice, so we should presume that most people do it for powerful and
at least initially compelling reasons. States that restrict immigration limit the freedom of
potential immigrants and demand that non-citizens obey their laws. This requires some kind of
explanation.
I will begin my analysis of potential explanations by discussing Michael Walzer’s view
of territorial rights based on the communal “right to place.” Next, I will discuss John Rawls’
view of territorial rights based on an analogy to property rights that I call the “custodial view.”
It is debated the extent to which you may have the right to use force to expel an uninvited guest from your
property. However, few deny that you would be justified in locking them out.
14
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Both of these views, though worth discussing, are underdeveloped, and fail to establish a
convincing theory.
Miller presents the most in-depth account of territorial rights, which echoes John Locke’s
theory of property. This view, I maintain, does not sufficiently capture our intuitions about
territorial rights, and its criteria are both too vague and too inflexible to do the work we need
from such a theory.
In the final two sections of this chapter, I discuss Henry Sidgwick’s remarks about
territorial rights in the Elements of Politics. While not entirely satisfactory, I argue that Sidgwick
presents a more compelling view of territorial rights than the other thinkers I reviewed. The last
section presents my own conclusions about how we should think about territorial rights broadly
and border controls in particular.

Walzer and the right to place
In Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer discusses the nature of territorial rights as an
ethical grounding for the exclusion of immigrants. While he offers a relatively expansive defense
of the rights of refugees and non-citizens residing within a nation’s territory, he offers moral
justification for blanket immigration restrictions, as long as the community supports them.
Some of his arguments focus on the importance of immigration restrictions to preserving
civic community, which I will discuss in the next chapter. Here, I will focus on his arguments
about claims to territory.
First, Walzer notes that, as I’ve discussed, nations are unique in their claims to territorial

15

rights, which entail a control of “physical location.”15 “With this control,” he writes, “comes
certain obligations.”16 Walzer’s vision of these obligations comes Hobbesian social contract
theory, in which the government’s authority is justified by an (non-historical) implicit contract
between the state and the people. The obligations entailed by the control of territory are not
simply limited to a country’s citizens but to non-citizens residing in the nation’s territory.
These obligations of the state by virtue of its territorial control include the individuals’
“right to place”—that is, the right to have somewhere to live. Walzer continues:
The right is not, indeed, to a particular place, but it is enforceable against the state, which
exists to protect it; the state’s claim to territorial jurisdiction derives ultimately from this
individual right to place. Hence it has a collective as well as an individual form… The
state owes something to its inhabitants simply, without reference to their collective or
national identity.17
He goes on to say that while individuals can expect to be entitled to the place they happen to
occupy, the place they’ve lived with their families and created a life. If, for some reason, this
land becomes unavailable, they are entitled to somewhere nearby. This helps explain why, for
instance, Germany has territorial rights over Germany and not Sweden. Germany is where
citizens of the German government live; the German government has an obligation to provide
them a place to live, and Germany is the most natural and fitting place to provide the land.
The historical connections between the people and the land, moreover, give them reason
to want to hold on to that land. And those reasons give the state reasons to assert territorial rights
over the people’s historical land claims. By claiming authority over a unified geographical area,
a people also preserve their national identity and community going forward.
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“Nations look for countries because in some sense they already have countries: the link
between people and land is a crucial feature of national identity,” Walzer writes. He also notes
that many of the key functions of a state, including distributive justice, education, and welfare
programs are best facilitated by a state with territorial rights over its land.
These arguments, as far as they go, establish the people’s reasons for favoring a state
with territorial jurisdiction over land historically connected to a nation. However, the analysis
thus far provides no reason or justification for excluding immigrants from this land. Allowing
newcomers to enter a country’s territory does not inherently limit the state’s ability to fulfill the
needs its people have for place, connections to the land, and the functions of a state that require
(or at least function best under) a unified geographical territory.
To argue that immigrants can be justly excluded, Walzer frames the issue as a question of
“aid.” He argues, plausibly, that there must be some limit to our obligations to provide aid to
others—few accept the consequentialist view that we must sacrifice whatever is necessary to
improve the overall wellbeing of humanity. Since the obligation to aid is limited, so too, Walzer
concludes, is our obligation to allow immigrants to enter our territory.
The view of allowing immigration as a form of aid, however, is unfounded. Territorial
rights, under Walzer’s conception discussed so far, do not imply a right to exclude. Exclusion
itself is a burden a state enforces against others—both foreign and domestic. It proclaims that
certain lands—even those owned privately—are off-limits to foreigners without proper
permission from the state, and it asserts as legitimate the use of border agents and whatever
necessary force to back up these demands. Letting immigrants enter, then, is best seen not as a
form of aid, but as the removal or absence of a threat of force.
Once immigrants have made a home in a new country, the state may gain new obligations
17

to them, as dictated by the country’s internal laws. But these obligations are determined by the
internal political considerations and deliberations of the state and people, in response to the
perceived utility and duty to provide aid. If incoming immigrants were imposing demands on the
nations resources that were too onerous, stretching beyond what the state and the citizens could
reasonably be expected to provide, then it could be permissible for the state to reconsider
legislation that requires such onerous aid. Since excluding immigrants from the country entirely
would not be necessary to the state to be avoid the excesses of benevolence, the limitations on
the duty to aid cannot justify discretionary immigration restrictions.
Walzer considers this counterargument, but the defense he offers against it is troubling
and insufficient. He highlights the “White Australia” policy, an explicit endorsement of a racist
immigration restriction, which was heartily defended by Australian officials as promoting a
“homogenous” society of largely a single European race. Walzer argues that if Australians were
to face the prospect of a mass southward immigration from Asia, and they were not permitted to
exclude newcomers at will to their territory, they would have only two options: they could allow
the mass immigration and accept a multi-ethnic society, or they could cede some of their land to
the newcomers and accept a smaller white Australian country.
This choice, Walzer implies, is particularly burdensome. If states were demanded to cede
land every time national migration trends called for it, he argues, this would undermine the very
idea of territorial rights. He writes: “To argue, for example, that living space should be
distributed in equal amounts to every inhabitant of the globe would be to allow the individual
version of the right to place in the world to override the collective version.”18
And given the importance he places on a community’s ability to maintain its national
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identity, which I will discuss in more detail in the next chapter, he argues that states must have
the right to exclude immigrants. But I should note here that the White Australia policy is a
particularly pernicious form of immigration restriction, reflecting many of the false and
dehumanizing ideas that drive anti-immigrant sentiment as discussed in the introduction. These
kinds of reasons for exclusion are generally thought completely illegitimate within liberal
democracies. Race cannot be a moral reason to exclude groups of people from schools,
workplaces, public accommodations or towns. Therefore, it’s hard to see how it could be
justified as grounds for exclusion from a nation.
Walzer’s appeal to territorial rights as grounds for restricting immigration rights is also
dubious. His consideration of the proposal for the equal distribution of territory globally is not a
serious vision proposed by those who object to immigration restrictions; in fact, I know of no
cosmopolitan theorist who has proposed this idea. Rejection of a farfetched alternative cannot
justify discretionary immigration restrictions.
It’s also worth noting that Walzer’s example of a massive wave of hundreds of thousands
of immigrants from Asia entering Australia could only be the result of a massive humanitarian
disaster. When a massive tsunami hits or devastating wars break out, some of these burdens may
affect neighboring countries. It’s not implausible to think that citizens of countries not directly
affected by the catastrophic phenomenon would have an obligation to bear some of the costs,
even if these costs are substantial.
But Walzer’s overall view of immigrants seems to exclusively cast them as burdens to be
dealt with. This is a simplistic and largely mistaken view of immigration. Consider, for instance,
the fact that U.S. cities and states tend to be recognized as thriving when they are attracting more
internal migrants, while regions where few want to move are sources of concern. New entrants to
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a city, state or country can bring new wealth, innovation, labor and economic opportunities along
with them, even when they come from poor countries.
When immigrants are recognized as individuals who will expand the size of a society,
rather than merely burden it, Walzer’s territorial arguments for limiting immigration, already
resting on weak foundations, fall apart. As I have discussed, his theory of territorial rights does
not provide a moral basis for excluding immigrants. The discussion of “White Australia” offers
his view no additional support.
It’s conceivable that a massive influx of immigrants could become a drain on resources
and a serious burden on a receiving country under certain conditions. If certain unfortunate
circumstances applied, these consequences could even potentially be disastrous for the
immigrants themselves, but the incentives at play could give each individual immigrant an
apparent reason to act in a way that, when followed through en masse, is worse for everyone.
Such group dynamics play out in the case of a bank run. Under such extreme circumstances, a
state may well be justified in levying significant restrictions on immigration. But this
justification only applies to specific emergencies (that may, admittedly, be enduring). This no
more justifies discretionary immigration restrictions than the government’s authority to
quarantine people with particular infectious diseases gives it unrestrained permission to lock up
citizens for any reason.

Rawls and the custodial view
When Rawls discusses the foundations of territorial rights in The Law of Peoples, he
begins by acknowledging that borders are largely built upon historical contingencies. They are,
in this way, troublingly arbitrary from a philosophical perspective. Nevertheless, he finds
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grounds for supporting territorial rights by analogy to property rights:
The point of the institution of property is that, unless a definite agent is given
responsibility for maintaining an asset and bears the loss for not doing so, that asset tends
to deteriorate. In this case [of national boundaries] the asset is the people’s territory and
its capacity to support them in perpetuity; and the agent is the people themselves as
politically organized.19
In other words, the assertion of territorial rights allows the state to act as a competent steward or
custodian of the nation’s lands for the benefit of the people. In an earlier passage, Rawls says
that these territorial rights allow the government to take responsibility not only for the territory
and the capacity of the land to support the people, but also “the size of the population… [and]
maintaining the land’s environmental integrity.”20
Like Walzer, Rawls approaches the question of immigration as if it is inherently a
burden; he names immigration second in the list of three major foreign policy “problems,” in
between unjust war and weapons of mass destruction. Since, as discussed in the introduction,
empirical research does not justify this view of immigration, it’s hard to interpret this view as
anything other than unreflective prejudice.
Rawls does not frame his theory of territorial rights as a justification for restricting
immigration. In fact, his assumption that states have a presumptive right to restrict immigration
serves as motivation for his theory of territorial rights. In emphasizing the importance of
territorial rights and the purpose they serve, he writes: “People must recognize that they cannot
make up for failing to regulate their numbers or to care for their land by conquest in war, by
migrating to another people’s territory without their consent.” Later, in a footnote, Rawls says
his view implies “at least” a qualified right to restrict immigration, but he doesn’t explain why or
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on what grounds.21 He also approvingly cites Walzer’s claims that cultural protectionism can
justify excluding immigrants, a point I return to in my next chapter.
Rawls also asserts that immigration only has four causes: religious/ethnic oppression,
political oppression, famine (due to political failure), and overpopulation. He says that in his
vision of “realistic utopia,” all of these problems will be solved, and the “problem” of
immigration will be “eliminated.”22 This is worth noting because it suggests that Rawls’ utopian
vision is one of minimal intermixing of populations across borders. It’s not clear why we should
think this state of affairs is desirable, unless we completely discount any of the myriad reasons
human beings might have to immigrate to another country beyond those Rawls considered: love
of a foreign nation, the pull of adventure, increased economic opportunity, unique job prospects,
educational opportunities of all sorts, dissatisfaction with the laws and practices of one’s home
country (even if they’re not unjust), and natural disaster, to name just a few.
Another major problem with Rawls’ theory of territorial rights is that it takes too much
for granted. He writes: “In the absence of a world-state, there must be boundaries of some kind,
which when viewed in isolation will seem arbitrary, and depend to some degree on historical
circumstances.”23
But we can accept that there must be borders of some kind and that these will inevitably
be somewhat arbitrary without accepting existing borders as they are. Why should, for example,
Scotland accept that it is a part of the United Kingdom? Or why should the Kurds accept that
land they occupy is part of Iraq? Rawls might say that they must accept these claims insofar as
the United Kingdom and Iraq operate as stewards over the territory occupied by the Scots and the
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Kurds.
However, the Scots and the Kurds could have plausible grounds for secession so long as
they were also able to form governments to perform as stewards over their lands. If they could, it
would seem they would have as equal a claim to territorial rights as the existing governments.
Rawls might claim that for reasons of stability, we should recognize only the territorial of
existing states. But this is unsatisfactory, as it might seem to imply that the Nazi invasion of
France gave the Germans legitimate territorial rights over the occupied land. Similarly, an appeal
to “stability” could have been used to justify maintaining the sprawling and oppressive expanse
of the British Empire, now widely regarded as unjust. A theory of territorial rights should be able
to make sense of these more complex cases, but Rawls’s account provides no such guidance.
There’s also a fundamental tension in Rawls’s formulation of territorial rights. He says
we must, essentially, take state borders as they are, and that their territorial rights serve the
purpose of maintaining a certain territory as an asset. But we can’t assume that the configuration
of nation states as it exists does promote the preservation of territory as an asset. Suppose a
group of states share access to a particular asset—a natural resource vulnerable to overuse. Such
resources may be much better maintained with a single unified government, which could prevent
excessive competition that might unleash a tragedy of the commons. In these sorts of cases, two
key components of Rawls’s theory of territorial rights—respect for historical borders and the
stewardship duty of the state—seem to contradict.
The theory also suffers a serious deficit when compared to Walzer’s similar theory. By
relying on an analogy to property rights, Rawls’ version of territorial rights presents a serious
weakness when trying to justify immigration restrictions.
This is because the responsibility for maintaining an asset, a key reason Rawls thinks we
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should value territorial rights, is neither necessary nor sufficient to ground the institution of
property. If the point of a property rights regime were simply the maintenance of the homes as
assets, the state ought to redistribute ownership of the of, say, homes to whoever among its
citizens is best able to maintain their value and prevent it from deteriorating. This is neither how
the institution of property works nor how it plausibly ought to work.
Instead, property rights help to protect individuals’ interests in being able to use objects
in myriad ways. The institution of property is designed to protect individuals’ interests in
preserving the value of goods and (particularly in the case of land) creating more value in an
economic system. But we also have reasons to want to occupy land, engage in trade, use tools,
and consume things in ways enabled by the institution of property unrelated to the preservation
of value. In burning a candle, I destroy it’s economic value—it can never be resold—as I extract
from it the value it has for me personally for the time I am able to use it. It’s for these all these
reasons that the institution of property can be justified and (except in extreme libertarian
conceptions of justice) supplemented through redistributive schemes based on need.
This is a problem for Rawls’ theory of territorial rights because it raises the question of
whether existing territorial claims—and the putative authority they give to states to justify
restrictive immigration policies—is serving the full range of interests that a system of property is
meant to fulfill.
The analogy is further flawed because while states have mechanisms to regulate and
facilitate the institution of property, there’s no supra-national authority to regulate the institution
of territorial rights. If we follow Immanuel Kant, Thomas Hobbes, or David Hume in thinking
that private property rights are necessarily tied to a system of government that can establish and
enforce the institution on principles of justice, then Rawls’s analogy to property rights falls apart.
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As Hume wrote, property must be an established “convention enter’d into by all the members of
the society to bestow stability on the possession of those external goods, and leave every one in
the peaceable enjoyment of what he may acquire by his fortune and industry.” 24 Such a
convention entered into by all cannot exist with regard to territorial rights without something like
a world-state, which would render territorial rights moot. But without such a convention
providing amelioration for the injustices inherent in the arbitrary distribution of territory, it’s not
clear why foreigners should be expected to accept a country’s claims to territorial rights, and
thereby, the right to restrict immigration.
I next consider—and reject—David Miller’s neo-Lockean theory of territorial rights that
mirrors John Locke’s natural right theory of property, which does not require a national a
governing body or universal assent to ground property claims.

Miller and the neo-Lockean view
On David Miller’s neo-Lockean account, the state obtains territorial rights based on the
property rights of the people, considered holistically and cross-generationally. These are rights
established by a collective of individuals with property rights, rather than comprising merely the
aggregate of the rights all the individuals.25 Miller tells us that there are two ways in which these
kinds of groups can obtain claims to territorial rights. The first form of these claims can be
established by transforming the land positively in a material way, and the second is established
by adding symbolical or cultural value to the land.
Territorial rights are only strengthened by material change to the land when the changes

24

Hume (2003) pg. 348.

25

David Miller (2012) pg. 258.

25

add what Miller calls “universal value.” And if the changes only have subjective cultural value,
then they must not detract from the overall universal value of the land if these changes are to
strengthen the rights-claim.26 Territorial rights can be passed to successive generations, as these
individuals contribute to the value of the land and cooperate with those who previously added to
its value. The existence of symbolic value of land from the perspective of a particular group adds
to their claim for rights, so long as the land that has symbolic significance is within the group’s
homeland and assuming the symbolic claims are historically accurate.27
For example, the Sioux people believe the Black Hills is sacred land for their community.
In a statement rejecting a monetary settlement for the lands, currently claimed by the U.S.
government, President Theresa Two Bulls of the Ogala Sioux tribe said recognizing the
sacredness of the Black Hills was essential to ensure that “our youth are engaged in keeping our
culture intact and always growing towards the future.” This type of claim, tying the cultural
value of the land to the continuation of the people, exemplifies Miller’s symbolic value
condition. (It should also be said that the Sioux have more formal claims to the land regarding
historical treaties that were violated by the U.S. government and a legacy of unjust treatment,
though it’s noteworthy that they still choose to talk about their claims by appealing to the
sacred.)
By making space for these types of symbolical and cultural claims in his account, Miller
admirably avoids the pitfall of a purely materialistic conception of value that would privilege
certain communities’ claims to land over others. This view picks up on important aspects of the
way communities, in fact, make claims about their rights to particular territories. Nevertheless,

26

Ibid pg. 260.

27

Ibid pg. 262.

26

this attempt to provide a two-pronged theory of the foundations of territorial rights fails in two
ways. First, the symbolic value condition is too limiting a concept to cover all seemingly
legitimate territorial claims that do not fall under the category of added material value. In other
ways, however, it is too broad, and would suggest competing land-claims where we should think
no real dilemma exists.
Miller explains that symbolic value comes from a given land’s role as a centering force of
national identity. We might feel this is an appealing claim to make in the case of the Sioux’s ties
to the Black Hills, but its vagueness is troubling.
Consider the following. There is much land which the government of Canada may own
which is uninhabited and untouched. Much of it may not be “culturally significant,” at least not
in a robust reading of the phrase. Does the lack of material or symbolic value added to the
remote parts of Canada indicate that the government does not have any justified territorial
grounds there? Perhaps Miller would think that this is entailed, but it then becomes very unclear
where the lines are drawn. A strip of highway through otherwise deserted flatland would give
Canada claim to the highway, thereby presumably adding material value to the land, but how
much of the surrounding area can thus be claimed by Canada? On Miller`s account, it is unclear.
It might be objected that the status of Canada as containing all the land within its borders
is culturally significant for the Canadians and thus gives them claim to the land. However, it
seems if we allow this thought, territorial claims of this sort are very easy to come by. Suppose
Alaskans thought it was culturally significant that the Alaskan border should include parts of the
Northwest Territories. Miller’s response in this case would be that the justification fails to
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include the Northwest Territories as a part of the Alaskan “homeland.”28 But this seems to just
beg the question. Alaskans certainly could see the Northwest Territories as a fundamental part of
their territory, at least as much as the Canadians would (assuming we are still discussing
uninhabited portions.)
Miller claims that he finds it to be unlikely that the symbolic value claims of nations will
include blatant historical falsehoods.29 This may be true, but such claims need not contain
falsehoods to be unpersuasive. The concept of Manifest Destiny, that Americans had a divine
right to expand, has a long and verified history. If some feel this gives them claim to extend
further into uninhabited, undeveloped Canadian land, Miller`s account might entail that they
have at least some claim to do so. But this seems mistaken. It is not simply that Canadians have
stronger claims to territorial rights over their uninhabited land, we assume, but Americans do not
have any legitimate claim in this instance at all.
As I stated, Miller has good reasons for including symbolic value in his theory. He writes,
“Relying simply on the material value argument would indeed bias the theory towards groups
that look like developed Western nations.”30 This is a fair point, but it’s doubtful that symbolic
value solves this problem. Though the Sioux describe their ties to the Black Hills in terms
amenable to Miller’s theory, others might not.
It’s hard to see how nomadic groups could make any kind of land claims on the neoLockean model—which was also a problem for Locke’s original property theory. As travellers,
they wouldn’t add value to the land in the conventional sense, but they also might not think of
the land “symbolically” either. Instead, they value the land they travel upon for the use they
28
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make of it and could plausibly argue that territorial claims would help protect their ways of life.
Miller would likely respond that their claims would be symbolic value claims, but it is very
difficult to see how this really works. Could a group add symbolic value to lands they had not yet
travelled to?
These questions are important, because the answers have ramifications to how we treat
the claims of those who were abused by the procurement of territorial rights. Indigenous tribes
who were forced off their land may not have had territorial rights as we now conceive of them,
and the notion of symbolic value is insufficient to address the divergence in concepts of land
ownership.
Turning to the focus of this chapter, Miller is explicit that his theory of territorial rights
grounds a right to exclude. He argues that, given the material and symbolic value a nation’s
people have put into the land, it will naturally matter to them how many people occupy the land.
“If there are too many [people], it may become impossible for land to be used in the way
that the group’s values require, as pressure for new housing, roads and commercial development
mounts,” he writes.31 In other words, overpopulation may effectively reduce the population’s
perceived value in the territory.
While this is true, it applies as much to internal migration as it does to foreigners
immigrating to the country. And yet, Miller does not argue that these considerations justify the
state’s right to discretionary restriction of internal migration grounds. Indeed, most philosophers
working within the liberal tradition, along with United Nation’s Declaration of Human Rights,
recognize freedom of movement within one’s own nation as a key right to be protected.
It’s also not clear why the values of present occupants of a territory should be decisive.
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Their interests will be privileged by existing law and by the requirements placed on those
seeking citizenship. The theory of territorial rights is supposed to explain why it is that a
country’s population can claim that its interests in the land trump the interests of other would-be
claimants. But this theoretical aim cannot be achieved by simply asserting that the values of the
population could be undermined by immigration, because the would-be immigrants’ values could
be undermined by exclusion. Assuming that the value the population places on the land are
decisive begs the question at hand.
One more point worth noting: Miller’s aim in his discussion of territorial rights may
differ somewhat from mine from either a terminological or metaethical standpoint. He writes:
“The argument establishes only that the group that legitimately controls territory, whether a
nation or an indigenous people, should have the right to decide who has the right to enter – it
does not determine which exercises of that right are justified and which are not.”32
My discussion of territorial rights focuses on the moral question of whether and to what
extent immigration restrictions can be justified. In my view, if a population has a moral right to
exclude immigrants (or execute any other policy), then it, by definition, is morally justified in
doing so.
Miller appears to reject this claim, asserting that a state may have the moral right to adopt
a policy that is morally unjustified. But it is not clear why he accepts this view. To defend this
view, one might think Miller could appeal to this type of claim: While a person may have a legal
right to act in a certain way, they are not necessarily morally justified in so acting. The apparent
contradiction is resolved by referring to two distinct normative schema: the legal and the moral.
But since the questions under consideration are pre-legal—we are concerned with whether states
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are entitled to enact restrictive immigration laws—this distinction is not relevant.
I surmise, then, that Miller takes himself to be discussing whether the international
community should recognize a nation’s immigration restrictions as acceptable. That may, indeed,
be a separate question from whether such laws are morally justified.

Sidgwick
Sidgwick’s view of territorial rights is often interpreted as a defense of immigration restrictions,
despite the fact that it was written at a time with relatively few such restrictions. However, as I
will argue below, the best interpretation and application of the ideas he presented—jettisoning
the parts that are outdated, biased, or inaccurate—actually provides a strong argument against the
discretionary view of immigration restrictions.
In The Elements of Politics, Sidgwick notes important differences between the
foundations of the institutions of property rights and territorial rights:
The main justification for the appropriation of land to the exclusive use either of
individuals or of groups of human beings is that its full advantages as an instrument of
production cannot otherwise be utilised; the main justification for the appropriation of
territory to governments is that the prevention of mutual mischief among the human
beings using it cannot otherwise be adequately secured.33
But while he argues that this grants the state its traditional jurisdictional rights, his comments
about the right to exclude immigrants are more circumspect:
I do not think that the right of any particular community to the exclusive enjoyment of the
utilities derived from any portion of the earth's surface can be admitted without limit or
qualification any more than the absolute exclusive right of a private landowner can be
admitted. The rigour of this right has hitherto been mitigated, in modern States generally,
by the practical allowance of free immigration; but if this should ever be sweepingly
barred, I conceive that the right of exclusion would be seriously questioned in the case of
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States with large tracts of waste land suitable for cultivation and that some compromise
would be found necessary between the prescriptive rights of the particular State and the
general claims of humanity. On the one hand no well-ordered community could
reasonably be required to receive alien elements without limit or selection; on the other
hand, an absolute claim to exclude alien settlers adequately civilized, orderly, and selfdependent, from a territory greatly underpeopled, cannot be justified on the principle of
mutual non-interference.34

As Teresa Hayter notes in Open Borders: The Case Against Immigration Controls, and as
Sidgwick’s 1981 text reflects, the modern states’ right to exclude is a relatively new invention of
the last century or so.35 Looking at a world without immigration controls—and, it should be
observed, the transportation technology that makes immigration substantially easier—Sidgwick
retained some skepticism of the discretionary right to exclude immigrants.
In fact, while it may appear that Sidgwick holds a relatively balanced view about
restrictive immigration policies, his view is actually exceptionally permissive of immigration.
When he denies that the state has an “absolute claim” to exclude immigrants, he is denying the
claim that I have repeatedly found unjustified by the territorial rights views discussed so far.
Territorial rights as conventionally conceived supposedly ground a nearly unilateral and entirely
discretionary option to exclude immigrants at the population’s or government’s whim.
Sidgwick does constrain the groups of people a country may be required to accept with
the phrase “adequately civilized, orderly, and self-dependent.” There are surely racist
implications contained in this description; however, under a generous recasting of his theory, we
may read it as restricting the pool of acceptable immigrants to exclude criminals, mischiefmakers, and invading forces. When he wrote, “no well-ordered community could reasonably be
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required to receive alien elements without limit or selection,” these types may be among those
who can be selected against. Further, community mechanisms of immigrant selection can include
the job and housing markets, which do not require a government threat of force to back them up.
While I am admittedly taking expansive liberties in this interpretation of Sidgwick’s view, these
modifications, which I believe are in the basic spirit of his theory, push Sidgwick toward the
“open borders” camp of immigration theorists.
The reasons Sidgwick provides for denying a blanket right to exclude are of particular
interest. First, he cites the existence of “territory greatly underpeopled,” and second, he appeals
to the “principle of mutual non-interference.”
While Sidgwick is clearly discussing uninhabited land when he speaks of underpeopled
territory, this part of his theory could also benefit from a modern modification. For example, he
writes:
[W]here the territory was already fully peopled by human beings the immigration is not likely to
be considerable, unless the war has been unusually destructive, since there would be no room for
the immigrants without such a violent invasion of the private rights of the old inhabitants as
would be generally condemned and would excite strong resistance and general odium.36
Sidgwick’s conception here of “fully peopled” land is curious—it’s not clear what it would
mean. Consider, for instance, that the population of New York City in 1900 was about 3.5
million, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. By the end of the century, the population was 8
million. With increasing density of housing and infrastructure, the level at which the city could
be “fully peopled” is indeterminate.
On the other hand, the land that Sidgwick is surely referring to—sprawling unoccupied
landscapes—is actually a much more demanding place for immigrants to occupy, in terms of the
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burden it places on the state. Were immigrants to move to a country’s unsettled lands, they
would require utilities to be installed, postal routes, access to medical services, educational
institutions, and all the other services for the needs the state is designed to meet.
The work of “unpeopled territory” in Sidgwick’s theory is actually better replaced with
the idea of unfilled capacity for population—something cities and other occupied regions of
countries actually have in spades (though zoning laws can limit capacity.) Using this better
concept, Sidwick’s theory would have been even more permissive of immigration.
Next, consider the principle of mutual non-interference, which is closely tied to the idea
of unpeopled territory in Sidgwick’s argument. Denying people access to available land when
they have great need or want of it may be bad enough. But restrictive immigration policies don’t
just deny the provision of land. These restrictions are backed up with the threat of force. Border
crossers can be apprehended by armed officers; undocumented immigrants can be confined;
violators of the law can be deported. Backing up the restriction of immigration to unpeopled
lands with the threat of violence is, in Sidgwick’s view, a potentially unjust violation of the
principle of mutual non-interference.
Another way to think about this is that territorial claims—particularly those that include
control over immigration—impose themselves on the world. By claiming to have territorial
rights over a given geographical area, a state limits and interferes in the freedoms of non-citizens
who may have an interest in visiting or occupying land. That this limitation comes with the threat
of violence demands justification, which thus far I have found lacking in theories of territorial
rights.

Territorial reasons, not rights
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None of the accounts discussed above provide a fully satisfying foundation of territorial rights
that could justify the discretionart exclusion of immigrants. Though it may yet be the case that a
very clever philosopher may produce such a formulation, I am doubtful that any full-fledged
theory will succeed. Given the extent of anti-immigrant bigotry founded in racism, elements of
which appears to have infected some of the intellectual discussions of territorial rights, I believe
we should treat the project with skepticism.
Instead of a theory of territorial rights, I suggest that we should be open to the various
reasons that people have for making claims to given territory. As I have alluded to, there may be
cases, such as the claims of the Sioux on the Black Hills, that may require adjustments of the
current arrangement of national borders. Secessionist claims may also require readjustments and
reconfigurations. But this is something our account of territorial claims should accommodate.
Political theory that completely justifies the status quo is hardly credible.
But as we’ve seen, peoples can make claims to territory on a wide range of grounds. Their
land might be particularly symbolically important for them, in any number of cultural or
religious ways, or just broadly meaningful because it’s the land of their ancestors. Or it could be
the only land they know, where they’ve developed a form of life to which they are particularly
well suited, which cannot easily be replicated when emigrating. Or it could be land that they
have materially added value to over generations, which they feel entitles them to possession of
the land. Or perhaps they simply have had a valuable and important culture and society, and the
land was what enabled them to maintain it.
We ought also to count considerations commonly thought to ground territorial “rights” as
broad reasons for territorial claims. These include stability, state viability, the enforcement of
property ownership, and the existence of reasonably just regimes, as discussed by Walzer,
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Rawls, and Sidgwick. States as we know them require territory, and the functions of the state can
produce significant value for the citizenry. So the mere existence of a valuable state will count
some way toward justifying territorial claims.
But strong territorial claims are most persuasive with regard to establishing the state’s
jurisdictional boundaries. As I’ve argued, the foundations of the territorial claim to limit
immigration are relatively weak. Since these limits constitute a serious imposition on others, and
the enforcement of this imposition violates the principle of mutual non-interference, the state’s
reasons for restricting immigration must pass a very high threshold.
Meanwhile, states must recognize that immigrants often have very compelling reasons to
enter their territory. They may be fleeing persecution, escaping poverty, joining with family
members, or attempting to start a new life. These are all very strong reasons that ought to be
respected. Since, as I have argued, the proposed theories of territorial rights do not justify a right
to exclude immigrants from territory, these reasons immigrants have to enter must be taken very
seriously. In many if not most cases, I believe, these reasons will be decisive.
It’s also worth noting that the notion of “reasons” that I am employing is not necessarily
additive. That is, it need not be read as an endorsement of consequentialist moral theories.
Reasons can interact in many different ways, and they need not function with an aggregative
nature; certain reasons rule out other kinds of reason from consideration at all, without
“outweighing” them.37 This allows for a prioritization of indigenous claims over those of present
day regimes, even if the total “weight” of the reasons for the countervailing territorial claims is
roughly equal. The exact form this adjudication will take cannot be predetermined, though I take

For instance, when deciding whether or not the accused in a murder trial is guilty, the jury mustn’t consider the
potential benefits to victim’s family that might accrue from a guilty verdict, but only the evidence. Other standard
objections to consequentialist reasoning apply.
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this flexibility to be a part of the appeal of this approach.
Rights are a ubiquitous conception in both national and international legal frameworks, so
my proposal will likely be met with resistance. Peoples and nations are used to assuming that
they have a right to exclude immigrants. However, I maintain that the discussion of various kinds
of reasons is preferable for use in the moral and political debates immigration. First, because I
think the foundations of such rights are dubious, as I’ve discussed, but I also because I think
discussions of reasons are actually more uncontroversial and flexible. They are merely facts that
count in favor of certain claims, and this idea is fundamental to any moral or political dialogue.
My impetus for this research project was the observation that contemporary immigration
policy debates typically proceed without any reference to the moral foundations of restricting
immigration. If we dispel with the notion that states have a fundamental right to territory that
allows them to exclude immigrants, we could begin to have a much more humane conversation
about the reasons they have for coming.
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CHAPTER 2: Nationalist Partiality
If we dispense with, as I have urged, the notion of a moral right to territory, we find
ourselves in a world populated with people making various claims to land that need to be heard.
Among these claimants will be those who are seeking to immigrate.
How ought a just nation to respond to these claims? Without being able to appeal to a
strong national right to its territory, it must take these claims seriously. But those wishing to
defend restrictionist immigration polices have another argument to make. They can argue that
members of nations have special obligations to their co-nationals over and above what they owe
to foreigners—that is, they are partial to their own fellow citizens. Another way of expressing
this idea is that we should give the reasons and interests of our fellow citizens greater weight
than that we allow for the reasons and interests of those outside our borders.
Though the term has a variety of definitions, for this paper, I give the label of
“philosophical cosmopolitanism”—hereafter just “cosmopolitanism”—to the view that national
boundaries have no relevance to the moral obligations between people. Cosmopolitans believe
that the like interests of one’s co-citizen and of a foreigner should count equally in moral
deliberation. Nationalists, on the other hand, believe that we have special obligations to our cocitizens, and we ought to weigh their interests more heavily in our deliberations. (I do not
consider the view exclusionary nationalists, who hold that it is only they in their particular
country who have special obligations to one another—a view few political philosophers find
credible.)
If the nationalist view is correct, we may be able to justify largely restrictionist
immigration policies. While we would consider the interests of those who are trying to
immigrate, they would need very strong reasons to override even relatively weak reasons that a
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nation’s population had for wanting to exclude them. This wouldn’t justify a completely
discretionary right to exclude, because certain kinds of proposed reasons for barring immigrants’
entry—such as, for example, belief in racist myths about other countries—may not count as
reasons at all. Since, as I’ve discussed, much opposition to immigration is erroneous in this way,
many discriminatory immigration policies would be unjustified even if we are justified in being
partial toward our co-citizens.
Arguments in favor of nationalist partiality tend to ground the special relationship of cocitizens in either the ties created by the state to ground partiality or on the pre-political
connections among citizens. I will present two versions of each type of argument and explain
why I think they fail to justify immigration restrictions. The arguments I provide would extend, I
believe, to other versions of these arguments.
When a nation considers the claims of potential immigrants, then, it ought to weight the
reasons the newcomers have equally with any reasons the present population has to restrict entry.
Though not an endorsement of completely open borders, this argument suggests that
restrictionist immigration policies are much more difficult to justify than is typically supposed.

Nagel and the dual role of citizens
Thomas Nagel argues powerfully for nationalist partiality in “The Problem of Global Justice.”
The foundations of immigration policy and the right to exclude are not Nagel’s explicit concern,
though. Instead, Nagel adjudicates in the article the merits of cosmopolitan and nationalist (he
uses the term “political”) conceptions of socioeconomic justice, which is concerned with the
distribution of benefits and burdens among individuals and their relative levels of wellbeing. I
will test his theory of nationalist partiality as applied to immigration policy and argue that it fails.
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However, my arguments do not explicitly address the implications for socioeconomic justice.
Under a political conception of justice, the obligations of socioeconomic justice apply
only to co-citizens of nation states. Cosmopolitan justice, by contrast, extends the claims of
socioeconomic justice to every person in the world. Though Nagel thinks cosmopolitan views of
justice are appealing to a certain extent, he argues in defense of political justice on the grounds of
nationalist partiality.
Nagel states a central challenge for proponents of political justice: “Whatever the
standards of equal rights or equal opportunity apply domestically, the question is whether
consistency requires that they apply globally.”38 Since Nagel thinks that socioeconomic justice in
part consists of redressing arbitrary inequalities, we must ask whether inequalities based on
national origin are arbitrary or salient. Just as race, religion, and ethnicity ought to be irrelevant
when we consider the obligations imposed by the value of equality, on a Rawlsian theory or any
plausible alternative, we might think that a person’s nation of birth and citizenship are similarly
irrelevant. If these factors are morally irrelevant, then limiting justice to the political conception
would be erroneous and objectionable. We could make similar claims about discounting the
interests of potential immigrants.
So are there features of the relationship among co-citizens that justify partiality? Nagel
argues that calls for justice arise from the fact that those in democratic societies are “fellow
participants in a collective enterprise of coercively imposed legal and political institutions.”39
They act collectively through the usual democratic practices and by upholding a system of laws.
These institutions are coercively imposed; laws are backed up with the threat of violence from an
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armed police force and a punitive penitentiary system. Partiality for co-nationals is justified,
Nagel argues, because they exist in a special relationship as “participants in the ‘general will.’”40
Some of the facets of the “dual roles” are left obscure. For example, Nagel writes that cocitizens are “both putative joint authors of the coercively imposed system, and subject to its
norms, that is, expected to accept their authority even when the collective decision diverges from
our personal preferences.”41 But it’s not obvious what “accept” means here. Citizens may or may
not follow any given law, respect it as legitimate, or agree to help enforce it.
Meanwhile, foreigners and potential immigrants can be subject to a state’s laws as much
as its own citizens. States, after all, do not only coerce their own citizens. They potentially use
violent force (or threats) against visitors, immigrants, denizens, and those in other nations, in the
form of everyday policing, border patrols and military power. Wars, tariffs, treaties, and
international institutions impose costs and burdens, sometimes death, on foreigners.
Restrictive immigration policies are themselves a major from of coercion. As I’ve
discussed, the claim to territorial rights involves an assertion of governmental authority over a
particular area of land—establishing, in the famous phrase, a “monopoly on the legitimate use of
violence.” Since we live in a world with a limited land area, any jurisdictional and territorial
claims necessarily reduce the territory available to other individuals and peoples to make use of
and occupy. Precious resources are cordoned off and monopolized. Territorial claims are thus put
limits on the freedom and opportunities of the rest of the world’s population.
Some might argue that this isn’t really coercion, because as long as foreigners avoid
those regions in which the state has jurisdiction, they will not be subject to its will. But this
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would be the equivalent to saying that citizens are not really coerced by their own government,
because as long as they follow the laws, they are not subject to its will. Neither of these
arguments succeeds, because the threat of force is a paradigmatic case of coercion—just think of
the proverbial gun to the head—even when the force is never carried out.
So one might fairly say that the state’s coercion of its own citizens is therefore nothing
special—it coerces everyone. If this is right, Nagel’s invocation of the coercive nature of the
state as the foundations of nationalist partiality would be significantly undermined.
Nagel offers a response to this objection:
Immigration policies are simply enforced against the nationals of other states; the
laws are not imposed in their name, nor are they asked to accept and uphold those
laws. Since no acceptance is demanded of them, no justification is required that
explains why they should accept such discriminatory policies, or why their
interests have been given equal consideration. It is sufficient to claim that the
policies do not violate their prepolitical human rights.42
This passage shows clearly that Nagel holds the view I am arguing against. Under his
theory of partiality toward our co-citizens, Nagel believes no justification of immigration laws is
due to the would-be immigrants and their interests do not deserve “equal consideration.”
Nagel’s suggestion here that foreigners are not expected to “accept” immigration laws
rings hollow. There are constant demands that potential immigrants “wait their turn” and “play
by the rules.” Undocumented immigrants within a country are expected to both comply with
existing laws and to “accept” arrest if they are apprehended—at least as much as any citizen
would be expected to “accept” the enforcement of laws. They may not be expected to “uphold”
the law, as Nagel points out—but then, most citizens who are not law enforcement professionals
are not expected to do anything to uphold immigration laws either.
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Even if we grant that there’s a unique way in which citizens do accept and uphold their
nation’s laws, these laws are nevertheless enforced upon non-citizens. Unwanted would-be
immigrants are turned away from border crossings by armed guards. Sometimes undocumented
immigrants are killed by border police. Others are arrested, deported, or forced into dangerous
attempts at entry in order to avoid law enforcement.
The fact that their bodies are acted upon—to the point where they are sometimes killed—
is a more significant fact than the claim that laws are done in their citizens’ names and demand
the citizens’ acceptance. This use of coercion call for justification.
Nagel might respond that killing an undocumented immigrant violates pre-political rights
(what we might call human rights), and that’s what demands explanation. Even short of killing,
confinement and physical deportation of bodies without consent is generally seen as a violation
of human rights. Since his view allows that immigrants’ fundamental rights should not be
violated, he might argue that while general enforcement of border laws is permissible under his
theory, it disallows objectionable forms of coercion that takes the form of human rights
violations.
But we cannot determine whether or not these rights are being violated unless we can
assess whether or not the immigration laws themselves are just. We do generally recognize that
states can confine and lock people up when they have good reason to do so—for instance, if
they’re a dangerous criminal. Similarly, though recent advocacy movements have persuasively
argued that they occur much less often than we might assume, there are plausibly some
circumstances in which law enforcement can reasonably use lethal force against civilians if no
other option is available to maintain safety, such as in the case of a hostage-taker. But whether
these police actions are justified depends on whether or not the laws in question are themselves
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just. Nagel’s view seems to imply that most any immigration policy will be justified, because the
immigrants themselves are owed no justification. Under this theory of state power, potential
immigrants are subject to high levels of government coercion.
Nagel would point out, however, that his theory justifying nationalist partiality is twofold: Citizens are partial to each other not just as mutual subjects of the state’s coercion, but as
co-authors of the laws upheld in one another’s names. Even if my argument that foreigners are
also subject to state coercion is correct, I certainly haven’t shown that they are co-authors of the
law.
And indeed, they are not. But this should actually be seen as another strike against
Nagel’s view. Consider another passage from his essay:
[T]he state makes unique demands on the will of its members—or the members
make unique demands on one another through the institutions of the state—and
those exceptional demands bring with them exceptional obligations, the positive
obligations of justice. Those obligations reach no farther than the demands do…43
As these remarks make clear, it is the demands on the citizens to participate in the general will
that “bring with them exceptional obligations”—the ties of nationalist partiality, in my phrasing.
But these demands may be rather weaker than Nagel may suppose. Some people never
vote and hardly ever think about politics. Through the course of their lives, they may give little
thought to the laws they live under. While these laws are still, as I have argued, fundamentally
coercive, they may not feel particularly burdensome in the subjective sense.
Contrast this with the very real burdens placed on any potential immigrant. Their options
for entry are heavily constrained. Even if they are admitted, they have to navigate a complex
array of applications, rules and deadlines to keep their status up-to-date and valid—with
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deportation as their constant threat. Most, however, will simply be denied legal entry, and if they
attempt to come in unauthorized, the obstacles they’ll face are formidable.
What corresponding benefits do would-be immigrants get from the state? They may
receive foreign aid, and perhaps the bare consideration of their applications is a benefit of sorts.
And, in Nagel’s view, the country must recognize their fundamental human rights. But they also
may live under the foreign government’s military power, market forces, pollution, and treaties.
Unlike the citizens of the state, they are denied the opportunity to co-author the state’s laws.
The burdens a country may place on foreign citizens, in the ways I’ve described, may be
significantly more costly than the burdens it places on its citizens. Recall that the right to exit is a
fixture of international human rights law, meaning that while the state can unilaterally prevent
foreigners from becoming immigrants, according to Nagel, it must allow its citizens to become
emigrants, if they choose. So while the state coerces both its own citizens and foreigners, it
mitigates the coercion of its citizens by providing them a voice in the formation of laws and a
right to exit.
I will assume that giving the right to vote and an unencumbered right to enter to potential
immigrants would be, for various reasons, untenable. But even if this is true, the asymmetric
nature of the mitigation of the coercive power of the state would seem to demand that—at the
very least—the interests of potential immigrants should be treated equally to the interests of
existing citizens and residents when crafting border policy.
Is it right to conceive of the “being part of the collective will” component of being a
citizen as mitigating the state’s coercion? Nagel curiously describes this feature of citizenship as
a demand, which he says is “unique.”
But whether this is demand is best thought of as demanding, it is also certainly a benefit,
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at least partially. And potential immigrants generally want this “demand” placed on them—they
want to become a part of the collective will of the country they’re trying to join. The coercion
they are subject to is, in no small part, an effort to deny them access to this collective will
(consider the furor over the mere idea that undocumented immigrants might illegally vote in the
United States).
On Nagel’s view, then, the special obligations to our co-citizens are grounded on a
privilege we reserve to ourselves and deny to potential immigrants—even while subjecting them
to the coercive power of the state. While not incoherent, this idea should strain the credulity of
any thinker in the liberal tradition.

Richard Miller and the ties of residency
Richard Miller argues in Globalizing Justice that the “ties of modern citizenship” create special
obligations and partiality between co-nationals. Though he refers to these as ties of citizenship,
it’s more accurate to say residency, since he argues this partiality entails “a duty to relieve
disadvantages of all who make their home in the territory of one’s government.”44
Which kinds of ties create this special moral relationship? Miller argues that the “justified
functions” of a state bind people together and generate mutual obligations. These functions
include:
•
•
•
•
•
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Enforcement of property rights
Taxation
Provision of public facilities
Financing of education
Regulation of commerce and business cycles

Richard Miller (2010) pg. 39.

46

These “diverse and vitally important roles of a modern state … generate a rich array of political
duties toward disadvantaged compatriots,” Miller writes. 45
To his credit, Miller emphasizes the importance of the duties we have to the least well-off
residents of our country. And he acknowledges that international commerce and enforcement can
generate some of the important obligations to foreigners that they do with compatriots. These
obligations are weaker, though, because they are only based on commerce and not a rich array of
state functions.
He argues that the ties of the modern state give us strong reasons to support those who
are disadvantaged—even at the expense of disadvantaged foreigners. He writes: “[E]ven if the
citizenry of a developed country had a duty of justice to open its borders to those who seek to
make use of economic opportunities, this responsibility would fall far short of their duty to
relieve socially imposed disadvantages of compatriots.”
In justifying this assertion, Miller relies on a few empirically dubious claims. He says that
most of the disadvantages people face are due to structures within their own countries, rather
than because of immigration restrictions. However, as Ahmed et al. have shown, inequality
between countries is a larger driver of global inequality than inequality within countries.46 But
even if, say, the Indian government’s failure to provide its citizens with a just level of
redistribution were the cause of some of its impoverished citizens’ choice to immigrate, the
receiving country could not justly use this is an excuse to exclude them. The Indian
government’s failure to treat its citizens fairly is another deprivation—above and beyond
poverty—that the immigrants seek to rectify by finding a new home. By refusing to let the

45

Ibid.

46

Ahmed et al. (2017) pg. 23.

47

foreigners enter, the would-be receiving nation is using its coercive powers to force the would-be
immigrants to remain in an unjust state.
Miller notes that immigrants often come “reluctantly,” seeming to imply that this fact
demands a better solution and mitigates the cost of exclusion. But it actually strengthens the
claim immigrants have to make on the receiving countries. If immigrants are reluctant to leave
their homelands but do so anyway, they likely had compelling reasons to do so—reasons that
must be taken seriously. It is easier to justify disregarding someone’s whims than the deeply
considered choices they make when they have few good options.
Miller also seems to assume that incoming immigrants, at least at a certain level, would
be a burden to the receiving country’s disadvantaged citizens. As I suggest in the introduction,
the evidence for this belief is far from decisive, and it is often inspired more by racism than
economic reality. However, if it is the case that incoming immigrants were expected to lower the
wages of poor, native workers, immigration restrictions are neither the only not the best solution.
A state can make up for this imposition with, for example, targeted wage subsidies like the
Earned Income Tax Credit.
This would allow the nation to both meet its obligations to its most disadvantaged
members while welcoming the immigrants. When these arrangements are feasible, the situation
has no trade-offs. And in such cases, the question of partiality need not be resolved. But perhaps
such trade-offs will not always be feasible and the partiality issue will remain.
Miller’s argument for justifying nationalist partiality still falls short because he doesn’t
recognize the necessity of the coercive element to maintaining borders. This creates another
function of state that we impose on foreigners in addition to ties of international commerce. It is
partially analogous to the maintenance of the institution of property, but, as I discussed in
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Chapter 1, territorial rights lack the governing institution that can take responsibility for ensuring
the institution is just. This consideration makes the obligations generated by the tie of
immigration restrictions even stronger, because imposing a system on others without safeguards
to ensure that it is just requires some kind of compensation if it is to be at all fair.
Miller also fails to consider the salience of the fact that potential immigrants seek to take
part in all the key functions of the state that justify partiality. This is particularly important
because when discussing each functions of the state that citizens participate in, he notes that
people have independent reasons to engage in these functions. For example, he says we all have
reason to favor a system of law enforcement that justly reduces overall violence, and we all have
reason to want schools that can create an educated populace.
But immigrants, too, have reasons to want to participate in and benefit from these
institutions. In Miller’s view, though, the pre-existence of these institutions within a nation
creates ties between its members that demands they favor themselves over foreigners, even over
foreigners who want to share in the institutions for the very same reasons.
Surprisingly, in the same chapter, Miller inadvertently gives strong arguments for
rejecting this view. When discussing the need for a reasonable amount of economic
redistribution within a society, he writes: “In the ongoing public enterprise of provision, those
who have already benefitted more cannot rightly claim more provision than others on the basis of
those prior benefits.” He later adds: “The prosperity of the well-off derived, to a large extent,
from their having benefitted richly from public provision of opportunities that the disadvantaged
could not take abundant advantage of, through no fault of their own.”47
Miller rightly applies this reasoning to the cleavage between a nation’s well-off members
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and the poor. But we should also apply it to the distinctions between a nation’s members and
foreigners. We can say, contra Miller, that the fact that the members of a nation already receive
the benefits of participating in state functions does not back up a claim of privileged exclusivity
to those benefits just because the residents received the benefits first. Potential immigrants have
been excluded from these state functions—through no fault of their own—that the members of
the nation have benefitted richly from. These conditions cannot serve to justify the potential
immigrants’ exclusion, backed up with a threat of violence.
Miller might respond by saying that this argument is unfair, because the people his
version of nationalist partiality seeks to protect are those who are disadvantaged, not privileged.
Since they are the ones who need protections, my attempt to turn his reasoning around on him
might fail.
However, compared to the disadvantaged residents of the receiving nation, the incoming
immigrants are almost certainly more disadvantaged. They lack access to the benefits of being in
the nation, which they presumably desire and that even the nation’s most disadvantaged have
access to. They also face the force of the border agents, who ostensibly serve to protect the
nation’s members.
Some immigrants, of course, will be of a higher socioeconomic class than the receiving
nation’s disadvantaged. These immigrants may indeed be better off along most or all measures
than many of the nation’s citizens. But these people—often called “highly skilled immigrants”—
are not plausibly seen to pose any kind of burden on the nation’s disadvantaged population. If
highly skilled immigrants drive down wages, they do so in highly paid fields like medicine and
engineering, which can actually decrease prices paid by the native working class.
So the more disadvantaged immigrants can make a claim to be let in because they are
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face more hardship than the receiving country’s disadvantaged native population. Well-off
immigrants can make a claim to be let in because they don’t pose an economic burden to the
disadvantaged population. For these reasons, Miller’s attempt to justify immigration restrictions
on nationalist partiality grounds fails.

The analogy to clubs and families
One likely response to my line of argument here—that the exclusionary nature of a nation
shouldn’t be used to justify a lack of partiality toward potential immigrants—would be to draw
an analogy to a clubs or families. Membership in a club or family, we usually think, is
completely up to the group’s discretion. The existing members can decide to include or exclude
any person and any number of people that they feel is appropriate. Nations, some believe, are
similar in this way to families and clubs.
Walzer makes a version of this argument. He argues that like clubs or families, countries
cannot bar people from exiting, but they can limit entry.
“Like clubs, countries have admissions committees,” Walzer writes. “In the United
States, Congress functions as such a committee … it establishes general qualifications, categories
for admission and exclusion, and numerical quotas…. Then admissible individuals are taken in
… mostly on a first come, first-served basis.”
He concludes: “This procedure seems eminently defensible…”48
Walzer admits that there are some moral qualifications on which kinds of admission
criterion may be used, though he doesn’t go into detail on this matter. Indeed, even within
families, there seems room for moral criticism. It would be wrong for a family to refuse to accept
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one member’s new spouse for racist reasons, for example, or to give a child up for adoption
because of its sex—even though, for other reasons, excluding a potential spouse or giving away a
child may be a defensible choice.
But we should be skeptical about the analogy to clubs and families (Walzer notes that the
family analogy may be more apt, given the assumption of hereditary citizenship.) First, no one
needs to be a member of a club or even a family. Acceptance by a country, on the other hand, is
virtually a necessity for the recognition of basic rights, because states are the only institutions
capable of protecting rights.
We also need access to states because of the resources and opportunities they provide.
Economic opportunities, educational opportunities, security, food and water are all much more
accessible in a well-functioning state than they are elsewhere.
And as I’ve been arguing, the territorial claims that states make impose demands on
everyone, even those outside their boundaries. They have both laid claim to a significant portion
of the Earth’s finite land resources, and they’ve bound the human and natural resources of that
land under their own jurisdictions. These claims are backed up by violent force. For these
reasons, the state is obligated to at least take seriously the claims potential immigrants make for
entry.
David Miller makes a similar point, writing:
In the case of state, the advantages that they deny would-be immigrants who are refused
entry are very substantial; and because states monopolize stretches of territory, and in
other ways provide benefits that cannot be replicated elsewhere, the “go and start your
own club” response to immigrants is not very plausible.49
Clubs and families are distinct from nations, additionally, because exclusive membership

49

David Miller (2014) pg. 199.

52

is a necessary condition of the nature of these institutions. A family that anyone can join or a
club with no firm membership rolls may perhaps not properly be called a family or a club at all.
These institutions are about creating and maintaining certain kinds of relationships among their
members, relationships that cannot be shared universally for the same reason you can’t be
everyone’s best friend.
Some people believe nations are like this; Bernie Sanders and Donald Trump made these
kinds of claims in my introduction. However, this is a mistake. A state with open borders would
still be a state; it could have a citizenry that participates in elections for politicians with authority
to govern over a given territory. Its territorial rights, which lacking the feature of border control,
would still include jurisdictional and resource sovereignty claims. Nothing about the concept of
the state requires exclusive membership.

Culture
Perhaps the most contentious reason given to support the idea of nationalist partiality and to
justify immigration restrictions is the appeal to culture. Valuing one’s culture above others, using
it to justify discrimination, and the devaluation of foreign cultures are all common argumentative
moves of the racist, and many of these appeals reflect little more than the bigotry discussed in the
introduction. However, serious philosophical arguments have been put forward about the
importance of culture to a nation and the effects immigration has on a country’s way of life, and
these claims are worth analyzing.
David Miller makes the case for regarding the preservation of culture as sufficient
grounds for immigration restriction in his essay “Immigration: The Case for Limits.” To begin,
he argues that states require a “common public culture” that helps support democracy and other
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important social goals. 50 Immigrants, however, will naturally come with their own cultural
attitudes, practices, and values, which will change the public culture by, say, shifting the mix of
religious beliefs.
Acknowledging that culture will necessarily change over time, Miller argues that
members of a country still have an interest in trying to shape the way the culture develops and
maintain continuity over time “so that they can see themselves as the bearers of identifiable
cultural tradition that stretches backwards historically.” 51 He does not explicitly cast his
argument as one of nationalist partiality; he merely says that preserving culture is a reason to
restrict immigration. However, he neglects the fact that, even if preserving culture may be a
reason to restrict immigration, many immigrants themselves likely have overriding reason to be
let in. He writes:
How restrictive an immigration policy [the cultural preservation argument] dictates
depends on the empirical question of how easy or difficult it is to create a symbiosis
between the existing public culture and the new cultural values of the immigrants, and
this will vary hugely from case to case … a political judgment needs to be made about
the scale and type of immigration that will enrich rather than dislocate the existing public
culture. 52
If, as Miller makes explicit, cultural preservation is simply a reason for restricting
immigration, then his argument in the above quotation is mistaken. Decisions about whether and
how to restrict immigration must consider the reasons a nation has to preserve culture as well as
the reasons that immigrants have to enter. Earlier in the essay, Miller argues against the idea that
there is a moral right to immigrate, but even if we accept those arguments, they doubtless have
reasons to immigrate.
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Miller’s argument only makes sense if we assume that the cultural reasons we have to
restrict immigration ground a form of nationalist partiality. Perhaps David Miller would want to
say that the bounds of cultural identity create bonds of partiality, similar to the Richard Miller’s
claims about the just functions of a state.
In one way, this version of culture-based nationalist partiality is on stronger footing to
respond to the objections I posed to Richard Miller’s view. I argued that immigrants are in part
coming to participate in the state’s functions such as education and regulated commerce, so these
institutions cannot plausibly serve to create an exclusionary form of nationalist partiality.
However, immigrants are not necessarily coming to participate in the cultural practices and
traditions of a state and may intend to reject them. This makes it a more plausible basis for
partiality.
It’s important to note that even if we accept certain versions of the arguments for
nationalist partiality, they may not have universal applicability. As Walzer notes—and David
Miller seems to agree—an argument for nationalist partiality based on culture would be of
limited use for a country like the Untied States. Walzer writes:
The claim of American advocates of restricted immigration (in 1920s, say) that they were
defending a homogenous white and Protestant country, can plausibly be called unjust as
well as inaccurate; as if non white and non-Protestants citizens were invisible men and
women, who didn’t have counted in the national census!53
Indeed, the United States—even New York City alone—is filled with so many pockets of
different cultures and countless ethnic enclaves that it would be patently ridiculous to maintain
that there was single culture to maintain. Immigration itself is a fundamental feature of American
culture.
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The argument may be more plausible for more ethnically and culturally homogenous
countries. Could Japan, for example, claim that its unique culture creates a bond of partiality
among its citizens that justifies discounting the interests of outsiders?
One way to push back against this argument is to say that the United States should serve,
in one way, as a multicultural model. It shows that unique and valuable cultures can exist
alongside others within the same country or city without tragic loss. Cultures do not need nationstates. Multiculturalism has its challenges, there’s no doubt, but that doesn’t mean exclusionary
immigration restrictions are justified. Democracy, too has serious challenges, but that doesn’t
justify autocracy.
Richard Miller, while defending nationalist partiality on other grounds, gives an even
more definitive reason for rejecting the culture argument. He points out that even in relatively
homogenous countries, there are still typically minority groups with different cultural practices
and histories. While cultures are the site of important values, these differences with the majority
culture cannot justify discriminatory political decisions. 54 If, for instance, the Japanese
government were to offer limited access to the national health insurance system to the Korean
minority living in the country because they were a cultural minority, this would be widely
regarded as unjust. Since cultural partiality cannot justify this form of political exclusion, it
cannot justify restrictive immigration policies. One might want to say that cultural partiality only
justifies exclusionary policies toward immigrants—but this simply begs the question. Why
immigrants should be treated differently at all is what the theory of nationalist partiality is trying
to explain, so an appeal to their mere status as immigrants cannot be a part of our answer.
Richard Miller argues that basing immigration restrictions on such cultural considerations

54

Richard Miller (2010) pg. 38.

56

would be an improper application of nationalist partiality. Analogously, while we are justified in
being partial to our families, nepotism is an improper application of familial partiality. I can’t
justify, for example, petitioning my local officials to change the law so that it disadvantages my
neighbors and benefits my family on the grounds they’re my family. For the same reason, I can’t
bar entry to potential newcomers because of my cultural connections to my compatriots.
As this example shows, even if one rejects nationalist partiality as grounds for
immigration restrictions, there might still be some forms justifiable of nationalist partiality.
It worth observing that there’s a fundamental tension in David Miller’s account of
cultural grounds for excluding immigrants. After arguing that cultural preservation justifies
restrictive immigration policies, he argues that immigration restrictions themselves cannot be
applied on a discriminatory basis.
“What cannot be defended in any circumstances is discrimination on grounds of race,
sex, or, in most instances, religion—religion could be a relevant criterion only where it continues
to form an essential part of the public culture, as in the case of the state of Israel,” he writes.55
David Miller’s quick switch from “in any circumstances” to “in most instances” should
give us pause. There’s no clear reason to distinguish between religion on the one hand and sex
and race on the other. In trying to provide such a reason, he says immigrants who are refused
entry are owed an explanation, and saying they belong to the wrong race or sex would be
insulting “because these features do not connect to anything of real significance to the society
they want to join.”56
But this does not sufficiently explain why a culture’s preference for immigrants of a
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particular race or sex is illegitimate on David Miller’s view. Would a nation with a deeply (and
genuinely) misogynistic culture be permitted to exclude women immigrants? Why should the
cultural basis of the racist “white Australia” policy be rejected on his view? These questions are
particularly hard for David Miller to answer given his inclusion of religion as a potentially
legitimate basis for exclusion. His explanation of the “insulting” criterion doesn’t hold water as a
justifiable distinction between race and gender on the one hand and religion on the other.
Immigrants who were denied because of their religion could likely be insulted for being denied.
Also, conspicuously missing from the list of illegitimate considerations for restricting
immigration is “national origin”—a commonly rejected basis for discrimination that would, of
course, undermine David Miller’s entire argument if included in his list. This troubling
instability in the view (absent from Walzer’s view, which troublingly permits racial
discrimination in immigration) should cast further doubt on its plausibility.
Some might believe, in spite of these arguments, that it is just too much to ask of a nation
that its cultural history be drastically altered by immigration and that restrictive policies cannot
ameliorate these effects. Can we really expect people to put up with changes to their languages,
religious norms, and values of their society?
I think the answer is yes. In fact, in liberal societies, we already demand this. In “The
Difficulty of Tolerance,” T.M. Scanlon argues that liberalism requires that, as members of free
societies, we will have to put up with changes in our culture that we don’t like. He notes that he
would not be happy to see religion become more culturally dominant and that he thinks that
sexuality and sexual attractiveness are given too much importance in society. However, part of
living with others is knowing that, while these cultural worries can be legitimate issues to worry
about, they should not be subject to legislative restriction.
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In a fascinating passage, he reflects on how tolerance is important in his relationship with
his children:
It is their society just as much as it is mine. What one learns as a parent, however, is that
there is no guarantee that the society they will want is the same one that I want.
Intolerance implies that their right to live as they choose and to influence others to do so
is conditional on their agreement with me about what the right way to live is. If I believe
that others, insofar as they disagree with me, are not as entitled as I am to shape the
mores of our common society, then I must think this of my children as well should they
join this opposition. Perhaps I hold that simply being my children gives them special
political standing. But this seems to me unlikely. More likely, I think, is that this example
brings out the fact that intolerance is a denial of the full membership of “the others.”57

This an astute observation is revealing, especially as it applies to immigration. If we accept, as I
have been arguing, that the moral foundations of immigration restrictions is much less firm than
is commonly supposed, we might fear that this view will lead to wave after wave of newcomers
that we can’t predict. But we should realize that, as each generation is born, we already receive
wave after wave of unpredictable newcomers. Though there is always incessant intergenerational
sniping, we recognize that the correct attitude toward the newcomers is one of acceptance and
respect. We should find a way to cultivate that same disposition toward the next generation of
those coming to our shores.
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